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TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF: TRUTH,
ASCETICISM, AND AUTONOMY
Michel Foucault's later work concentrates on the constitution of
the subject in ethics. His interest is not in a code-oriented morality, such
as he believes Christianity to be, for then according to Foucault,
subjectivation would occur in an almost juridical fashion, in which the
subject would refer his conduct to a law or code of rules to which he
would have to submit. Tbe notion of morality as disobedience to a code
of roles has, for Foucault, disappeared. Given this absence of morality, an
"aesthetics of existence" is proposed, for which areturn to the Greeks
provides a paradigm in the search for the beautiful existence. If Foucault
is, however, interested in Antiquity, it is not to propose the Greeks as an
alternative to our present problem, but rather to see how Greco-Roman
ethics can shed light on the problem of our present and of our present
selves.
According to Foucault, Greek ethics is not essentially concemed
with religious problems, nor is it related to any legal institutional system;
for the Greeks ethics is, rather, linked to the will to live a beautiful life.
And so, Foucault classifies the problem of our present as one in which the
arts of individual existence have to be renewed. An ethics grounded in
aesthetics seems to provide for Foucault an answer to the present absence
of morality and to the very grounding of morality. In speaking of the
present foundation, or lack of foundation, for ethics, Foucault says:
I wonder if our problem nowadays is not, in a way, similar to this one,
since most of us no longer believe that ethics is founded in religion,
nor do we want a legal system to intervene in our moral, personal,
private Iife. Recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that
they cannot fmd any principle on which to base the elaboration of a
newethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot find any other ethics
than an ethics founded on so-caUed scientific knowlcdge of what the
self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on. I am struck
by Ibis similarity of problems.'
Now what I wish to show briefly in this paper is that Foucault's
postmodern ethics is essentially an outgrowth of the Greeks' "care of the
self,"a reaction against Christianity, and a continuation of Descartes' sharp
IMichel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics," in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul
Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 343.
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distinction between the search for truth and the eonduet of life.
Although Foucault's work has dealt in great part with technologies
of domination and of power, whereby subjects have been objectified, his
later work sketches the history of how an individual aets upon bimself, in
the technology of self. According to Foucault, "Technologies of the self
...permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls,
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in
order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or
immorality."2 In late antiquity, technologies of the self were aimed at care
of the self, concern with the self, rather than at knowledge of oneself, for
tbe latter was only to be achieved through the former. In Plato's Apology,
Socrates exhorts men to concern themselves with themSelves, that is, with
"wisdom, truth, and tbe perfection of the soul.") But this care for the self
is also oriented toward care of the city. Soerates' mission is useful for the
city because in teaching people to occupy tbemselves with themselves, he
likewise teaches them to oceupy themselves with 'tbe city. Care of oneself
is for Socrates and for later philosophy at the center of the "art of
existence tt which philosophy claimed to be.4
In order to know how to live and to live happily, cultivation of the
soul is necessary; it is only thus tbat one ean return to oneself and reunite
with oneself. In Plato's Alcibiades I, it is evident that eare of self is not
essentially concemed with the body, for the self is not equated with
clothing, tools, or possessions. Care of the self is rather care for the
principle of activity which the soul is; for Plato, this care consists in tbe
effort of tbe soul to know itself. To take care of oneself thus consists of
knowing oneself. And the soul cannot know itself unless it looks at itself
in a similar element, in a mirror; it must thus contemplate the divine. And
it is through this divine contemplation that the soul will be able to diseover
rules for just behavior and political action. Thus, Alcibiades will be a good
politician to the extent that he contemplates bis soul in the divine
lPoucault. "Technologies of the Self, tt in Technologies 0/ the SeI/, ed. Luther H. Martin.
et alt (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1948), p. 18.
lIbid., p. 20.
4Poucault. The Care 0/ the SeI/. vol. 3 of 1he History 0/ Sexuality, tr. by Robert Hurley
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 20.
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element.s
If in Alcibiades I, the soul has a mirror relation to itself, which
refers to a process of memory and justifies dialogue as a method of
discovering truth in tbe soul, this is not exclusively the case in the
philosophical movement of Stoicism; in Plato, the themes of contemplation
of the self and care of the self are related dialectically through dialogue,
whereas in Stoicism we see the beginning of a culture of silence and the
art of listening: the masterIteacher speaks and does not ask questions and
the disciple himself does not .answer but must listen and keep silent.6 For
Plato, the truth is to be discovered within one, while for the Stoics, the
truth is not found in oneself but rather in the logoi, in the teaching of the
teachers. Tbe discovery of truth in both Plato and in the Stoics requires
care for the self or that self-forming activity which Foucault calls
asceticism. In his seminar on "Technologies of the Self, "in which Foucault
speaks not only of Greco-Roman philosophy, but also of Christian
spirituality, the fundamental question posed by the philosopher is the
relation between truth and asceticism. This question is, as Foucault sees
it, posed from the time of Plato to the Hellenistic age and also within
Christian spirituality, in which throughout there is no access to truth
without asceticism. In the philosophical tradition dominated by Stoicism,
askesis means the progressive consideration of self, or 'the mastery over
oneself, obtained through the acquisition and assimilation of truth. It has
as its final goal access to the reality of this world, or preparation for this
world. Through ascetical practices the truth that is acquired is
transformed into a permanent principle of action. As Foucault puts it,
"Aletheia becomes ethos. Asceticism for the Stoics is a process of
becoming more subjective. ,,7 Truth is thus for the sake of action: if one
cannot act, then one is not sufficiently master of oneself and one has
therefore not assimilated 'the truth. For the Stoics, truth is acquired
through the teaching of the teachers; what has been heard should be
memorized, so that the statements heard be converted into rules of
conduct. Truth is thus to be subjectivized. Stoic asceticism includes
exercises in which the subject puts himself in a situation in which he can
verify whether or not he can use the discourses which he has heard in his
'"Technologies of the Self, "p. 25.
6Ibid., p. 32.
'Ibid., p. 35.
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confrontation with the given event. He is thus testing his preparation: only
a truth totally assimilated can become ethics, onIy thus can the subject
behave as he should when the event presents itself. The truth is thus of
practical importance: the truth is to manifest itself in knowing how to live,
in the art of existence, in the good life.
It is evident, therefore, that the art of Iiving is made possible only
through a cultivation of self which in Plato means looking to the self for
the truth within, and in the Stoics becoming master of the self by listening
to the teaching of the master, which teaching is assimilated and
transformed into action. In both cases, we might say, the art of existence
is made possible through a discovery of assimilation of the truth which has
in turn been due to practices imposed on the self. Technologies of the self
are thus meant to be technologies of life, of how to live. From Socrates
to Seneca, as Foucault emphasizes, the problem was not the after-life or
whether or not God exists, but rather the problem of which technology to
use in order to live as weil as one ought to live. In order to live the good
life, the beautiful life, care of the self is essential. One's Iife then becomes
an aesthetic object; as Foucault puts it:
The idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art is
something which fascinates me. The idea also that ethics can be a very
strong strocture of existence, without any relation with the juridical per
se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary strocture. All that
is very interesting.1
According to Foucault, ,the language of Seneca, for example, is related not
to juridical but rather to administrative practices: self-examination is
presented as a taking stock of one's actions; faults are not judged against
a law in order to reproach the seIf nor are they regarded as defects of
moral character, but rather are evoked as lacks of success or errors in
strategy, or simply as good intentions left undone. The rules are thus not
for the sake of judging what has happened in the past, but rather the
means of doing something correctly. The rules of conduct are reactivated
so that one may be able to make adjustments between what one wanted
to do and what one had in effect done.
Now if in the Stoic tradition, the consideration or examination of
the self has as its final aim to prepare one for the reality of this world,
according to Foucault, a similar goal or preparation does not characterize
Christian spirituality. As he puts it,
lI"On the Genealogy of Ethics," p. 348.
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In Christianity asceticism always refers to a certain renunciation of the
self and of reality because most of the time your self is apart of that
reality you have to renounce in order to get access to another level of
reality. This move to attain the renunciation of the self distinguishes
Christian asceticism. 9
The Christian is not only to abide by the truths of his faith, but must also
seek self-knowledge in order to remove any obstacles within himself which
may hinder his progress toward the truth. Christianity thus imposes
obligations of truth, more so than does Stoicism; the Christian is obliged
to believe certain things, to accept institutional authority regarding matters
of truth, and when he examines himself, in pursuit of self-knowledge, to
disclose his findings either to God or to his spiritual director. Knowledge
of self thus brings about a pJrification of the soul. As Foucault sees it,
Aeeess to truth eannot be eonceived of without purity of the soul.
Purity of the soul is the consequence of self-knowledge and a condition
for understanding the text; in Augustine: Quis Jacit veritatem (to make
trutll in oneself, to get access to the light). to
Here purification of the self is equated with self-renunciation and more
specifically with a renunciation of the will through obedience.
Self-examination thus appears in Christianity and in particular in the
monastic Christianity which Foucault examines as something very different
from the Stoic self-examination. Whereas for the Stoics the practice of
self-examination has lead to autonomy and action, for the former the self
was to be constituted through obedience and contemplation, and thus
self-examination or self-revelation becomes in a sense self-destruction, that
is, a sacrifice of the self, of one's own will.
If we consider for a moment the Senecan relationship ofthe
disciple with tbe master, it appears that this relationsbip is different from
that which exists between the monk and his director, as described by
Foucault. In Seneca, the good advice of the master was to lead the
disciple to a happy and autonomous life. Tbe relationship was merely a
means to an end: when the disciple was sufficientlyequipped to lead his
own life, the relationship would end. Tbe disciple is thus to become
master of himself, belong to himself, as it were. In Greco-Roman
philosophy, practices of the self are thus to lead to the conversio ad se,
9"Technologies of the Seift" p. 35.
IOJbid., p. 40.
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whereby the subject escapes all dependences and enslavements to
ultimately rejoin himself; one becomes answerable only to oneself; one
exercises over oneself an authority that nothing limits or threatens; one
holds the potestas sui. 11 And what is more, "The individual who has
finally succeeded in gaining access to himself is, for hirnself, an object of
pleasure. "12 In becoming master of oneself, one is thus in touch with the
self and this relation to self enables one to delight in oneself, as jn a thing
one both possesses. and has before one's eyes, as in a thing, we might say,
which has been constituted as an aesthetic object.
The conversion to self which is the result of many of the
Greco-Roman technologies of the self is certainly very different from the
goal of ascetical practices in Christian spirituality. According to Foucault,
"Christianity substituted the idea of a self which one had to renounce,
because clinging to the self was opposed to God's will, for the idea of a
self which had to be created as a work of arte "l3 In Foucault's analysis of
monastic Christianity, "obedience is complete control of behavior by the
master, not a final autonomous state. It is a sacrifice of the self, of the
subject's own will. This is the new technology of the self." 14 With the
appearance of Christianity, Foucault believes that the classical care of the
self and its autonomy disappeared only to give way to a culture of the self
put to work for the exercise of pastoral power, although he also notes that
in the Renaissance there is a reaffinnation of the autonomy of the culture
of the self with the rise of religious groups which resist pastoral power and
claim the right to make their own statutes; there reappears in addition in
the Renaissance the notion of the self aS one's own work of arte It is
clear, however, that for Foucault Christian asceticism requires obedience,
that is, a renunciation of the self through a renunciation of one's own will.
Qnly thus can the Christian purify hirnself and have access to the
contemplation of God. Purification of the self makes possible the vision
of God. Foucault notes that in Christianity, "the problem of an aesthetics
of existence is covered over by the problem of purity," lS of virginity,
l1 7he eare 0/ the Self, p. 65.
12Ibid., p. 66.
I3"On the Genealogy of Ethics," p. 362.
14"Technologies of the Self, " p. 45.
n"On the Genealogy of Ethics," p. 365.
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according to the model of feminine integrity, whereas in Greco-Roman
asceticism, there is a virile model of self-domination. In Christianity,
therefore, according to Foucault,
Physical integrity ralber than self-regulation became imponant. (...)
The new Christiao self had to be constaotly examined because in this
self were lodged concupiscence aod desires of the flesh. From that
moment on, the self was 00 longer something to be made but
something to be reoounced aod deciphered. Consequently, between
paganism aod Christianity, the opposition is not between tolerance aod
austerity, but between a form of austerity which is linked to an
aesthetics of existence aod other forms of austerity which are linked to
the necessity of renouncing dte self aod deciphering its truth. 16
If in Greco-Roman practices of the self the final goal is autonomy and
preparation for action in this life through a conversio ad se or through
self-domination, in Christian asceticism, the goal is rather a conversio ad
Deum through, as it were, an aversion of self. Purity is stressed because
of the disorder or imbalance which sin has caused in man's nature and
because, as Foucault rightfully notes, there is no access to the light in
Christianity without making truth in oneself. What Foucault does not
however understand is that what seems to hirn to be a denial of the
subject's freedom because of what he perceives to be an imposition of
authority from without, is in actuality for the true Christian a perfectioning
of his freedom and of his personality. Purity is life according to the Spirit,
not a denial of the flesh, but an ordering, an enhancement, of the tlesh.
Purity's goal is to see as God sees, so that in order to have access to the
light one must see oneself in the light of the Model who is the Truth. Tbe
greater the conformity to the Model, the more one attains to the light, the
more one is free and the more perfected is one's personality. In a very
real sense, Christianity does, despite Foucault's opinion to the con~rary,
present us with an aesthetics of existence, in the sense that the light is
already given; it does not have to be constructed by man. Dut to affinn
this would be to recognize man's dependence on the light, and Foucault's
insistence on man's autonomy without its being grounded cannot
understand the paradoxical situation in which the Christian is ca1led to live.
For Foucault, then, modemity is, as it were, areaction against
Christianity. If self-examination or self-disclosure in Christianity is linked
to renunciation of self, in the modern world this is not the case.
l6/bid.• p. 366.
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From the eighteenth-century to the present, the techniques of
verbalization, of self-disclosure, have been reinserted in a different
context by the so-ealled human seienees in order to use them without
renunciation of the self but to constitute. positively. a new self. To use
these techniques without renouncing oneself constitutes a decisive
break."
The modem mind thus calls for a creation of the seIf, without reliance on
an external authority and acceptance of another's legislation. Obedience
or renunciation of the will is here replaced by the will not to be governed,
by areaction against governmentality. In "On the Genealogy of Ethics, "
Foucault recognizes that according to Christianity, there is "no access to
truth without ascesis; "18 the modem man will, however, proclaim his
autonomy by sUbstituting evidence for asceticism, in other words, by the
Cartesian ideal: "To accede to the truth, it suffices that 1 be; what is
needed is any subject which can see what is evidence. ,,19 If asceticism is
no longer necessary, precisely that which brings about the purification of
the self, then Foucault concludes "I can be imrnoral and knoW the
truth. ,,20
According to Foucault,
Descartes...succeeded in substituting a subject as founder of practices
of knowledge, for a subject eonstituted through praetices of the self. (.
.. ) Tbe relationship to the self no longer needs 10 be ascetic to get
into relation to the truth. 1I sufftees that the relationship to the self
reveals to roe the obvious truth of what I see for me to apprehend the
truth definitively. (...) Before Descartes. one could not be impure,
immoral, and know the lruth. With Descartes. direct evidence is
enough. After Descartes, we have a nonascetic subject of
knowledge. 21
And yet the notion of asceticism is not completely discarded from
Foucault's way ofthinking. Although Foucault is interested in the subject's
"RTechnologies of the Self, " p. 49.
IIII0n the Genealogy of Ethics," p. 371.
19/bid.
2O/bid., p. 372.
21/bid.• pp. 371-72.
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reaching "mature adulthood"--to borrow a phrase from Kant's essay "What
is Enlightenment?," which Foucault analyzes, --and with this maturity,
autonomy, his att\tude to the Kantian notion of Mundigkeit is not
completely Kantian. Foucault refers to Baudelairean modernity in order
to return to the idea of a self that is to be created as a work of art.
FoucauIt says:
The deliberate attitude of modemity is tied to an indispensable
asceticism. To be modem is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux
of the passing moments; il is to take oneself as object of a complex
and difficult elaboration. (...) Modem man, for Baudelaire, is not the
man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth;
he is the man who tries [0 invent himsetf. This modemity does not
'liberate man in his own being'; it compels him to face the task of
producing himself. 21
Man's autonomy is thus represented as aesthetic self-invention, with the
elimination of Kantian universalization, that is, the rational will expressed
in laws binding on all agents alike. As we have seen, according to
Foucault, there are code-oriented moralities, such as Christianity, in which
a quasi-juridical subject refers his conduct to a set of laws; in order to
substitute for these, he proposes ethics-oriented moralities, in which rules
of behavior are less developed and less important than individual
seIf-formation.
There is no doubt that for Foucault compulsory precepts and
universal codes present themselves in terms of domination and therefore
not in promotion of man's freedom. Foucault notes:
Tbe search for styles of existence as different from each other as
possible seems to me to be one of the points on which paJ1icular
groups in the past may have inaugurated searches we are engaged in
roday. The search for a fonn of morality acceptable to everybody, in
the sense that everybody should submit to it, strikes me as
catastrophic.13
It would seem that for Foucault the search for a personal ethics is opposed
to a universalistic morality, for which reason his aesthetics of existence is
n"What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, pp. 41-42.
11"The Concern for Truth," quoled in "The Cririque of Impure Reason" by Thomas
McCanhy, in PoUt;cal Theory, vol. 18, no. 3, August 1990,p. 460.
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presented in resistance to a so-called "science of life...24 For Foucault, 'the
self is not scientifically knowable and consequently one does not know who
one is meant to bel His ethics or self-constitution is therefore
non-teleological. The conduct of life requires, for Foucault, abreaking
down of idols and of fixed patterns, so that something radically new will
emerge.
Established patterns are to be challenged or transgressed in order
to determine what is no longer indispensable for the constitution of the
self as an autonomous agent. Just as the artist's work cannot be confined
to the copying of a model due to his artistic inventiveness and chance,
Foucault allows for a greater role to be played by contingency rather than
by necessity in the constitution of the self; his work "isnot seeking to make
possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science, it is seeking to
give new impetus, as far and wide as possible to the undefined work of
freedom. tt2S However, because Foucault's ethics has no apparent
grounding and is non-teleological, one might finally be tempted to ask why
then propose at alt an aesthetics of existence? Perhaps simply because of
the pleasure or delight which the beautiful engenders and which affects the
self. Or perhaps because having lost the light to which St. Augustine
refers, man has to create his own light, at any cost. It is this latter reason
which seems to me to be related to Foucault's question toward the end of
his life: Who can tell the truth? Who is the truth-sayer? If the very
ground for truth is not accepted, if there is no commitment to the truth,
is it evidence alone which will make me capable of telling the truth?
Foucault poses interesting questions, but the framework in which he works
does not, I believe, provide for adequate answers.
St. John's Vnlverslty ALICERAMOS
2·James W. Bemauer, Michel Foucault·s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought.
(Humanities Press International, Ine., 1990), p. 182.
2'"What is Enlightenment?" , p. 45-46.
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